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Abstract 
This paper uses responder pre-commitment and the Jungian theory of mental activity and 
psychological type, as measured by the widely-used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to 
gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three 
experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to make a 
nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design requires 
responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design includes a third 
person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being 
accepted. In general, we find behavior in our experiment to be consistent with hypotheses based 
on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of psychological type.  
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This paper uses responder pre-commitment and the Jungian theory of mental activity and 
psychological type, as measured by the widely-used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to 
gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three 
experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to make a 
nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design requires 
responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design includes a third 
person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being 
accepted. In general, we find behavior in our experiment to be consistent with hypotheses based 





Laboratory economics experiments are useful tools for testing game-theoretic hypotheses. 
However, games involving interactive behavior between subjects, and non-cooperative games 
such as bargaining, trust, and prisoner dilemma games in particular, have strong psychological 
components that cannot be ignored. The inevitable interpersonal nature of these games suggests 
that attempts to formulate and test game-theoretic hypotheses will benefit from an understanding 
of the mental processes that affect how subjects approach the decision problems they face. This 
requires a joint approach using experimental methods and psychological theory to test human 
economic behavior. 
This paper provides such an example by using self-reported responder pre-commitment 
to reject and the Jungian theory of mental activity and psychological type, as measured by the 
widely-used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a 
laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. The MBTI provides information on three 
potentially important psychological preferences of subjects participating in an experiment: (1) 
perception – how a person acquires information, (2) judgment – how a person makes decisions 
and comes to conclusions, and (3) orientation – the degree to which a person’s attention and 
energy is directed outward or inward.  We show that differences between subjects with regard to 
judgment and orientation in particular, as measured by the MBTI, lead to significant, predictable, 
and observable differences in subjects’ decisions in our experiment. Our research is the first that 
we are aware of to employ the MBTI specifically to investigate behavior in the context of a 
laboratory economics experiment. Using the MBTI and student volunteers from the U.S. Naval 




administering a personality test instrument directly either pre or post-experiment because all 
students completed the MBTI upon entrance to the Academy. 
Three experimental design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to 
make a nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design 
requires responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design 
includes a third person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on 
the proposal being accepted. The variants with pre-commitment were chosen in order to acquire 
information from responders beyond that of a simple accept or reject response. The three-player 
design was chosen to provide a richer experimental environment in which to test the behavioral 
predictions based on psychological type and are comparable to previous studies using three-
player ultimatum games (e.g. Brandstätter and Güth (2002), Kagel and Wolfe (2001), and 
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)). 
In general, we find behavior in our laboratory experiment to be consistent with 
hypotheses based on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of psychological 
type. That is, individuals with preferences for feeling (F) in judgment and extraversion (E) in 
orientation make higher offers than those with preferences for thinking (T) and introversion (I). 
The effect of a feeling (F) preference on offers is more pronounced in females than in males, 
although gender alone has no apparent effect. Offers are also higher when proposers know that 
responders make a binding pre-commitment, but are not different when a hostage is present. 
Extraversion (E) in orientation is consistent with a pre-commitment to accepting significantly 
lower offers than introversion (I). Responders also make lower pre-commitments when they are 




pronounced in females than in males even after controlling for judgment and orientation 
preferences. 
Several previous studies have investigated the role of psychological characteristics, such 
as personality differences between subjects, in explaining individual decisions in laboratory 
economics experiments. There are none that we are aware of that use the well-developed MBTI 
as the personality measurement instrument. There are also none that we are aware of for which 
administration of the personality test instrument is fully separated from the experiment itself.  
Boone, et al (1999) examine the correlation between the choice of cooperative or non-
cooperative play in a prisoner’s dilemma game with the four personality attributes: (i) locus of 
control, (ii) self-monitoring, (iii) type-A behavior, and (iv) sensation seeking. They find that 
internal locus of control, high self-monitoring, and high sensation are all positively correlated 
with cooperative behavior, particularly in repeated games, while type-A behavior decreases the 
likelihood of cooperation. 
Brandstätter and Güth (2002) examine the role of personality in bargaining games 
through a series of experiments in which subjects participated successively in a dictator game, an 
ultimatum game, and a combination game. They find that subjects’ self-reported “benevolence” 
is more important for offers when the responder is “powerless” (as in the dictator game) than 
when he is “powerful” (as in the ultimatum game). They also find that powerful responders’ 
scores on “social reciprocity” are positively correlated with how much they expect to receive 
from proposers. They find no significant correlation between self-reported levels of 
“intelligence” and either offers or demands.  
Because the personality characteristics of the subjects in Boone, et al (1999) and 




experiments, it is possible that the correlations between personality and behavior were generated, 
in part, by the framing effects of the personality questionnaires. In Boone, et al (1999) a 
personality questionnaire was administered within a two-week period of the experiments and in 
the context of an academic course in which the experimental participants (MBA students) were 
also enrolled. In Brandstätter and Güth (2002), subjects self-reported their personality 
characteristics prior to and following the experiment. Our subjects’ personality preferences were 
elicited in an entirely different setting, up to four years prior to the experiment. We are confident, 
therefore, that the subjects had no particular expectations about how their decisions in the 
experiment would be evaluated. 
Our experiment also differs significantly from the other studies in design and setting. In 
both previous studies, subjects were located in the same room. In Boone, et al (1999), subjects 
participated face-to-face in a single, large room, and subject names and earnings were announced 
to the group at the conclusion of the experiment. Only the three top earners in the experiment 
were rewarded. It is important to know if personality characteristics remain important when strict 
anonymity is maintained. We maintained anonymity in our experiments by separating 
participants by role (that is, proposers, responders, and hostages reported to, remained in, and left 
from different rooms) and by paying all subjects privately, in cash, at the conclusion of the 
experiment. In Brandstätter and Güth (2002) subjects played repeatedly in the same role as 
proposer or responder, although participants were randomly re-matched. We avoid any learning 
or sequencing effects that may be present in their study by using a simple, one-shot ultimatum 
game. 
  The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 




test instrument we used. Section 4 develops testable hypotheses for behavior based on theory and 
previous studies of psychological type and presents experimental results. Section 5 provides 
some discussion of the results, followed by concluding remarks in Section 6. A separate 
Appendix contains complete instructions for one of the treatments. 
2. The Experiment 
In a simple, two-player ultimatum bargaining game, player 1 (the “proposer”) must 
propose a division of a fixed monetary amount between herself and a second player (the 
“responder”). Player 2 decides whether to accept or reject the proposal. If player 2 accepts the 
proposal, each player receives the corresponding monetary amount contained in the proposal. If 
player 2 rejects the proposal, each player receives a disagreement payoff, typically zero. One 
game-theoretic prediction assumes players are concerned only with monetary payoffs implying 
that player 1 will propose a split that leaves player 2 with the smallest allowable amount, and 
player 2 will accept the proposal. In laboratory bargaining experiments, offers are much higher 
on average than expected under the simple game-theoretic prediction, with equal or near equal 
splits quite common, and responders frequently reject low offers. This has led to refined game-
theoretic predictions based on notions of altruism, fairness, and reciprocity, among other things.
1  
We conducted six variants of the simple, one-round ultimatum bargaining experiment 
based on the presence of three forms of responder pre-commitment and a third player. That is, 
we conducted two treatments each with alternatively no pre-commitment, nonbinding pre-
commitment, and binding pre-commitment. The six treatments resulted from conducting each 
                                                           




pre-commitment design with and without a third player (the “hostage”) whose payment 
depended on the bargaining outcome between player 1 and player 2.
2  
In each treatment, player 1 is instructed to propose a split of $15 between herself and 
player 2 in one-cent increments. Player 1 is instructed to write her offer on a decision sheet, the 
offer being the amount out of $15 that player 2 will receive if player 2 accepts her offer. In each 
pre-commitment treatment, all parties are informed of the pre-commitment and whether the pre-
commitment is nonbinding, in which case player 2 must still decide to accept or reject the offer 
upon receiving it, or binding, in which case rejection is automatic if the offer is less than the pre-
commitment level. Player 1 does not observe the pre-commitment decision before or after she 
makes her offer decision. Additionally, prior to making any decisions, both players are informed, 
where applicable, that payment of $5 to a third, real, non-decision-making player will be made 
upon acceptance of the offer. All players are informed that no payments will be made to any 
individual if the offer is rejected. The offers are collected, transported to the responder room, and 
matched randomly with a responder. Responders circle their accept/reject responses, except 
under binding pre-commitment in which case the decision is automatic and enforced by the 
experimenters, and the decision sheets are returned to the appropriate proposers. 
There was no show-up fee.
3 Participants were paid their earnings privately in cash at the 
conclusion of the experiment. The experimenters verbally assured participants that all players 
were real. Participants were also directed to one of three rooms upon arrival and were, therefore, 
generally aware that there were subjects sent to other rooms. We obtained 30 observations for 
each of the six treatments. Therefore, we obtained 180 total offer decisions, 180 accept/reject 
                                                           
2 The term “hostage” was not used in the instructions. The third player was referred to as player 3 in the instructions. 




responses, and 120 pre-commitment decisions (60 observations under binding and 60 under 
nonbinding pre-commitment). Subjects participated only once as either proposer or responder.
4 
Participants were students at the U.S. Naval Academy in various years of study. Students 
were invited to participate via email solicitation. While the solicitation process was quasi-
random, we made an attempt to recruit subjects from all personality types. The next section 
describes the fundamentals of the psychological test instrument. 
3. Psychological Type and the MBTI 
What distinguishes experimentation in economics from experimentation in the natural 
sciences is the lack of complete control over all experimental variables in the former case. That 
is, the experimental economist controls the experimental design, the parameters, the setting, and 
the instructions to subjects. While the researcher can control the choice of subject pool to some 
extent, the researcher has little influence over most aspects of the final subjects themselves. 
Improving our understanding of human economic behavior requires accounting for differences 
between individuals, especially if the differences are systematic, measurable, and provide 
meaningful predictions for behavior. As Caplan (2003, p. 395) writes, however, “Enumerating 
the thousands of ways that individuals vary is obviously not particularly helpful for empirical 
researchers.” There appears, quite literally, to be “endless degrees of freedom” (Stigler and 
Becker, 1977, p. 89) when it comes to measuring preferences. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 While a show-up fee would have been preferred for comparing the results of offers and rejection rates found in this 
paper to the literature, (U.S. Naval Academy) policy did not allow us to pay students for attendance.  
4 To make the task of recruiting easier, we invited some former proposers and responders to participate in later 
sessions as hostages. We felt that it was important to have real persons in the hostage role, and we did not want to 
lose the ability of individuals to participate as a proposer or responder by participating first as a hostage. Because the 
hostage makes no decision and is anonymous to both proposer and responder, having individuals participate more 




Personality test instruments, such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, provide a useful 
point of departure for controlling for individual-specific characteristics of subjects in order to test 
broader game-theoretic hypotheses. They also provide an interesting and meaningful way to 
examine any direct link between personality measurables and behavior patterns in laboratory 
economic experiments. 
The MBTI is derived from the theory “that much seemingly chance variation in human 
behavior in fact is not due to chance; it is the logical result of a few basic, observable 
preferences” (Myers, et al, 1998, p. 21). The MBTI is based on Carl G. Jung’s (1923) theory of 
psychological type which identifies different tendencies in mental activity among normal, 
healthy people. 
Jung’s initial observations concerned the orientations of extraversion (E) and introversion 
(I) that describe the degree to which a person’s attention and energy is directed outward or 
inward. “In the Extraverted attitude, energy and attention flow out, or are drawn out, to the 
objects and people in the environment” (Myers, et al, 1998, p. 26). “In the Introverted attitude, 
energy is drawn from the environment toward inner experience and reflection” (p. 26). 
Jung also identified four mental processes: sensing (S), intuition (N), thinking (T), and 
feeling (F). Sensing (S) and intuition (N) are the perception processes and describe how a person 
gathers information. Sensing “refers to perceptions observable by way of the senses” (Myers, et 
al, 1998, p. 24) while intuition “refers to perception of possibilities, meanings, and relationships 
by way of insight” (p. 24). Thinking (T) and feeling (F) are the judgment processes and describe 
how a person draws conclusions and makes decisions. Thinking (T) judgment leads to a decision 
“by linking ideas together through logical connections” (p. 24) while feeling (F) judgment leads 




Jung believed that while everyone uses the two orientations and four mental functions at 
different times, different orientations and functions are dominant in different people. That is, 
similar to right or left-handedness, individuals tend toward either extraversion or introversion 
and have a tendency to rely more heavily on either sensing or intuition in perception, and 
thinking or feeling in judgment. Jung’s dichotomous theory of orientation and the four mental 
processes is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The MBTI is a self-report questionnaire designed to identify which orientation and 
functions are dominant in an individual. Therefore, the MBTI identifies an individual as having a 
preference for extraversion (E) or introversion (I) in orientation, a preference for sensing (S) or 
intuition (N) in perception, and a preference for thinking (T) or feeling (F) in judgment. The 
MBTI also adds a fourth dichotomy not explicitly mentioned by Jung. This fourth dichotomy 
reflects whether a person prefers to use a judgment (J) attitude or a perception (P) attitude when 
“interacting with the outside, extraverted world” (Myers, et al, 1998, p. 26). “In the Judging 
attitude, a person is concerned with making decisions, seeking closure, planning operations, or 
organizing activities” (p. 26) while “In the Perceiving attitude, a person is attuned to incoming 
information” (p. 27).  
The MBTI refers to the reports on the four dichotomies as “personality preferences”, and 
we maintain this original language throughout the discussion of personality types below. That is, 
the dichotomous attributes are not absolutes. Everyone is not simply an extravert or an introvert 
– according to the theory people exhibit different personality characteristics at different times 
and in different settings. The type indicator is intended merely to depict individual personality 
preferences or tendencies that are dominant. Therefore, a person’s personality preferences can be 




personality “types”. The developers of the MBTI stress that type theory is greater than the sum 
of the parts. That is, there are important interactions between the dichotomous preferences that 
may lead to a richer set of behavioral predictions than the four main dichotomies imply. We 
hypothesize about and test some of the possible interactions below. For more information on the 
development and uses of the MBTI, including reliability and validity estimates, consult Myers, et 
al (1998). 
Figure 2 gives a breakdown of our subject pool by whole MBTI types. The most common 
whole type combination in our subject pool is ISTJ. The least common is INFJ. Table 1 provides 
a summary of our subjects by gender and MBTI dichotomies. For comparison, the table also 
provides personality type figures for the Naval Academy overall, and estimates for the U.S. 
population according to Hammer and Mitchell (1996).
5 The percentages for our experiment are 
the end-product of the recruitment process and the choice of subjects to volunteer. As evident 
from the table, they do not reflect perfectly the actual percentages of types either at the Naval 
Academy or in the general population. Furthermore, the personality preference categories are 
largely independent for our subject pool. That is, there is little systematic correlation across the 
preference categories. The only pairwise correlation of any significance is between the 
thinking/feeling and judging/perceiving components. Individuals characterized as thinking (T) 
types also tend slightly more often to be characterized as judging (J) types (Pearson correlation = 
0.211, sig. two-tailed = 0.005) rather than perceiving (P) types. While the correlation is 
statistically significant, it is fairly low. 
                                                           






A final note concerns the appropriate use of the MBTI data for statistical purposes. The 
nature of the self-report test is such that two individual’s quantitative scores are not directly 
comparable. Raw scores indicate “how sure the respondent is that she or he prefers one pole of 
the dichotomy over its opposite” (Myers, et al, 1998, p. 120). Scores do not indicate that a 
respondent has more or less of a particular preference. Therefore, we follow the dichotomous 
approach recommended by the developers of the MBTI for statistical purposes. That is, we use 
binary classifications of individuals for the four pairwise personality dichotomies rather than raw 
scores. 
4. Behavioral Hypotheses and Results  
Because many economic experiments require individuals to obtain information, make 
decisions, and interact with others (directly or indirectly), it is straightforward to expect that 
behavior may be influenced by differences in perception, judgment and orientation, as well as 
changes in the experimental design. In the following subsections, we develop testable hypotheses 
regarding personality, gender, and the experimental treatment variables as well as report the 
results from our experiment.  
Note that our personality hypotheses concern only main effects and two-way interactions. 
While more complex interactions may exist among the personality dichotomies, gender, and the 
experimental treatment variables, we have little theoretical basis for establishing predictions 
regarding such deeper interactions. Therefore, we neither hypothesize about nor test for these 
more complex dynamics. 
Before developing the hypotheses, we present summary statistics and explain the testing 
procedures leading to our results. We analyze the experimental results from three perspectives: 




offers and pre-commitment levels for each of the six treatments. The ranking of mean offers 
from lowest to highest both with and without a hostage is – nonbinding pre-commitment, no pre-
commitment, and then binding pre-commitment. Mean offers were higher with a hostage than 
without in the no pre-commitment and nonbinding pre-commitment designs, but were lower with 
a hostage in the binding pre-commitment designs.  
As shown in Table 2, mean pre-commitment levels were consistently lower when binding 
and with a hostage. Figure 3 displays the percentage frequencies of pre-commitments at selected 
levels for both binding and nonbinding pre-commitment sessions. The figure shows the pooled 
results for both hostage and no hostage treatments. A small number of subjects (approx. 7%) pre-
committed to accepting any offer when pre-commitment was nonbinding. Interestingly, however, 
when pre-commitment was binding, one-fourth of all responders pre-committed to accepting $0 
or $0.01 offers (10 out of 30 with a hostage, 5 out of 30 without a hostage).  
Out of 180 offers, a total of 19 were rejected (a rejection rate of 10.5%). Five of the 
rejections occurred in the no pre-commitment treatments, eight in the nonbinding pre-
commitment treatments, and six in the binding pre-commitment treatments. Seven rejections 
occurred with a hostage, twelve without a hostage. The 19 rejections occurred by MBTI 
dichotomies as follows: 9 E, 10 I; 8 N, 11 S; 13 T, 6 F; and 9 J, 10 P. No female rejected an 
offer. Figure 4 shows a breakdown of subject responders and rejections by whole personality 
types. 
The most direct way to control for experimental treatment variables and individual 
subject characteristics and thus test the following hypotheses is through regression analysis. 
Table 3 provides main-effects OLS regression results for offers in which we treat pre-




(binding and nonbinding) versus no pre-commitment. Column two looks separately at binding 
pre-commitment relative to no binding pre-commitment (that is, no pre-commitment and 
nonbinding pre-commitment). Column three looks separately at binding pre-commitment and 
nonbinding pre-commitment relative to no pre-commitment. Each regression also includes 
gender, the presence of a hostage, and the four personality dichotomies as explanatory variables. 
The four excluded dummies are introversion (I) in orientation of energy, feeling (F) in judgment, 
sensing (S) in perception, and perceiving (P) in orientation to the outer world. Because the x-
regressors are all dummy variables, the coefficients are interpreted as differences in mean offers. 
Table 4 provides main-effects OLS regression results for pre-commitment levels. Again, 
the other explanatory variables are gender, the presence of a hostage, and the four MBTI 
personality classifications. Here, we need only distinguish between binding and nonbinding pre-
commitment. Because two of the treatments had no pre-commitment, there are only 120 pre-
commitment observations to analyze. Our regression analysis of responses involves a probit 
analysis of responses (0 if reject, 1 if accept) with offer, personality, gender, hostage, and 
binding pre-commitment dummies as explanatory variables. The results from this regression can 
be found in Table 5. Note that, as one might expected, the results indicate that the actual offer is 
the most significant determinant of responses. 
Finally, in the following subsections we periodically explore potentially interesting 
interaction effects between the variables. Our procedure was to drop all insignificant variables 
from a given regression, and then systematically check for significant pairwise interaction terms 
that provide additional meaningful insight into more complex personality dynamics. This results 




results from this type of analysis, but only highlight our significant findings in pertinent 
subsections below as well as in Section 5.
6 
4.1 Judgment – Thinking (T) versus Feeling (F) 
Based on the theory underlining the MBTI, we expect the mental function of judgment to 
be one of the most likely personality variables to have explanatory power in the specific context 
of the simple ultimatum game. Quenck (2000, p. 7) writes, “When Feeling judgment is being 
used, there is concern for the impacts and consequences of a decision on individuals or groups of 
people. The goal of a Feeling decision is to maximize harmony and well-being for people and 
situations.” Myers, et al (1998, p. 24) state, “Thinking judgment relies on impartiality and 
neutrality with respect to the personal desires and values of both the decision maker and the 
people who may be affected by the decision.” Thorne and Gough (1991, p. 74), describe male 
thinking types in their studies as “planful, steady, organized, efficient and ambitious, as seeking 
objectivity and rationality, but also as being power-oriented.” These descriptions clearly suggest 
that feeling types should offer more as proposers and pre-commit to less and be less likely to 
reject as responders than thinking types. We formalize this expectation in Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Judgment - When comparing individuals with a preference for feeling 
(F) to individuals with a preference for thinking (T): 
 
  1A.  F types will make higher offers than T types.  
 
1B.  F types will make lower pre-commitments than T types. 
 
1C.  F types will be less likely to reject an offer than T types. 
 
We find strong support for Hypothesis 1A. As indicated in Table 3, feeling (F) types 
make higher offers than thinking (T) types, with offers averaging about $0.90 higher (sig. one-
                                                           




tailed < 0.01). We find only weak support for Hypothesis 1B. Although the point estimate does 
indicate higher pre-commitments for T types, the difference is not statistically significant (see 
Table 4). There was also no statistically significant difference in pre-commitment that could be 
attributed to judgment when interacted with either gender or orientation. Finally, we find only 
weak support for Hypothesis 1C. While the point estimate of the coefficient in Table 5 is 
directionally consistent (i.e. lower probability of acceptance by T types), the significance level is 
inadequate to draw any clear conclusion. This is certainly due in part to the low number of 
rejections.  
4.2 Orientation of Energy – Extraversion (E) versus Introversion (I) 
Orientation of energy seems likely to be equally as important as judgment, especially in 
the context of the ultimatum game. Extraversion is characteristic of individuals who prefer 
activities involving socialization or interaction with others. Thorne and Gough (1991, p. 74) 
describe extraverted types as believing in the “intrinsic merit of interpersonal cohesion”. They 
find that introverts “also appear to find more experiences to be ego-wounding than do 
Extraverts” (p. 72). In the context of an ultimatum game, we interpret making a low offer, or 
rejecting a low offer as actions that cause interpersonal disharmony and are thus actions that an 
extraverted type would avoid. Furthermore, accepting a low offer could potentially be viewed as 
ego-wounding. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Orientation of energy -When comparing individuals with a preference 
for extraversion (E) to individuals with a preference for introversion (I): 
 
  2A.  E types will make higher offers than I types. 
   
2B.  E types will make lower pre-commitments than I types. 
 
2C.  E types will be less likely to reject an offer than I types. 




We find only weak support for Hypothesis 2A. As shown in Table 3, the coefficient on 
the extraversion dummy is positive as expected, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
However, as seen in Table 4, we do find strong support for Hypothesis 2B. Extraverted types 
pre-committed to accepting offers that average $1.08 less (sig. one-tailed < 0.05) than did 
introverts (I), all else equal. Finally, we find only weak support for Hypothesis 2C. As with 
Hypothesis 1C, the point estimate of the coefficient in Table 5 is directionally consistent (i.e. 
lower probability of acceptance by I types), but the difference is statistically insignificant. 
We also hypothesize that extraversion (E) when combined with feeling (F) should result 
in an even stronger desire to avoid interpersonal disharmony. This is based on Myers, et al’s 
(1998) description of persons with the combination of extraversion (E) and feeling (F) as 
“action-oriented cooperators” who “like to make things happen for the pleasure and welfare of 
others. They focus on liking others and being liked and on connecting people with each other” 
(p. 58).  Indeed, we find that extraversion (E) in orientation, though not significant over all, is a 
significant determinant of offers when interacted with feeling (F) judgment. Although offers by 
ET types were found to be no different than for IT types, offers by EF types averaged $1.10 
higher (sig. one-tailed < 0.05) than for IF types. Furthermore, out of the 180 total offers, three 
were $15 offers (i.e. the proposer offered the entire pie). All three were male EF types. Although 
this last part is purely anecdotal evidence, it is consistent with Myers, et al’s (1998) description. 
In terms of pre-commitment, orientation of energy seems to be equally important for both 
feeling (F) and thinking (T) types in judgment, but not for both males and females. That is, ET 
types’ pre-commitments were lower than IT types’ on average by $1.04 (sig. one-tailed < 0.05) 
and EF types’ pre-commitments were lower than IF types’ on average by $1.09 (sig. one-tailed = 




tailed < 0.05), but interestingly there was no such difference between E_female and I_female. 
The latter two’s pre-commitment levels were virtually identical.   
4.3 Perception – Sensing (S) versus Intuition (N) 
  Because the mental function of perception (sensing versus intuition) describes only how 
individuals tend to acquire information, we have no basis for translating differences in perception 
into differences in observed behavior in the context of the ultimatum game. We believe the 
acquisition of information is not the fundamental mental function of interest in the ultimatum 
game, as the game is fairly simple and transparent. The more interesting dynamic stems from the 
individual’s need to balance monetary gain with their own internal values and beliefs, and this is 
predominantly a function of judgment and not of perception. This yields the following condensed 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Perception - When comparing individuals with a preference for 
sensing (S) to individuals with a preference for intuition (I), no difference in offers, 
pre-commitments, or rejections will be observed. 
 
  As shown in the regression result Tables 3, 4 and 5, we are unable to reject the nulls of no 
difference in offers, pre-commitment levels or rejections between S and N types. 
4.4 Orientation to the Outer World – Judging (J) versus Perceiving (P) 
Because responders in the ultimatum game must be attuned to incoming information 
(offers) we do speculate that individuals who tend to remain longer in the perception mode 
(namely, perceiving (P) types) may be more likely than judging (J) types to change their mind 
and, thus, violate their own nonbinding pre-commitment. However, we do not expect any 
difference with respect to offers, rejections or pre-commitment levels by J and P types. This 




Hypothesis 4: Orientation to the Outer World - When comparing individuals with a 
preference for judging (J) to individuals with a preference for perceiving (P): 
 
4A.  No difference in offers, pre-commitments or rejections between J and 
P types will be observed. 
   
4B.  P types will be more likely to violate their nonbinding pre-
commitment than J types. 
   
   
We find support for Hypothesis 4A in that we are unable to reject the nulls of no 
difference in offers, pre-commitment levels or rejections between J and P types (see Tables 3, 4, 
and 5). We find weak support for Hypothesis 4B. Responders rejected approximately 1/3 of the 
25 offers that were less than the non-binding pre-commitment level (8 rejections). J types 
rejected 3 of 13 “rejectable” offers, while P types rejected 5 of 12 “rejectable” offers. However, 
this difference is not statistically significant.
7 
4.5 Gender – Male versus Female 
Controlling for differences in judgment and orientation, we do not expect gender alone to 
have any impact on offers, pre-commitments, or probability of rejection.  
Hypothesis 5: Gender – In general, no difference in offers, pre-commitment, or 
rejections is expected between males and females.  
 
  With regard to offers and pre-commitment, we find no significant differences between 
males and females (see Tables 3 and 4). There were no rejections by a female. However, 
interpretation of this with respect to what effect gender has on rejections is complicated by the 
                                                           
7 The only statistically significant role we found anywhere in our data analysis for either orientation to the outer 
world (J versus P) or perception (S versus N) occurred when we interacted the two while examining pre-
commitment. Controlling for the known variables of significance (binding vs. nonbinding and the presence of a 
hostage), NP pre-commitments were $1.32 lower than NJ pre-commitments (sig. two-tailed < 0.10). However, the 
reverse was true for sensing (S) types. That is, SP pre-commitments were $1.15 higher than SJ pre-commitments 
(sig. two-tailed = 0.13). While it seems reasonable that perception and orientation to the outer world may play a role 




relatively small number of rejections in conjunction with the relatively low number of female 
participants. As such we make no statement of finding one way or the other. 
Interaction of gender with judgment (F vs. T) reveals that while feeling (F) increases 
offers relative to thinking (T) in both males and females, there is a dramatic difference in the 
absolute magnitude of the effects. Whereas F_male offers averaged $0.66 higher than T_male 
offers (sig. one-tailed < 0.05), F_female offers averaged $2.23 higher than T_female offers (sig. 
one-tailed < 0.01). In fact, thinking females had the lowest average offers, and feeling females 
had the highest average offers. 
4.6 Third Player - Hostage versus No Hostage 
We predict that the presence of a hostage will lead to higher offers and lower pre-
commitments in general. According to Jungian theory, all individuals use feeling judgment at 
certain times, even if they have a preference for thinking judgment. We expect the presence of a 
third, powerless player to trigger feeling judgment in both proposers and responders. This leads 
to the next hypothesis 
Hypothesis 6: Hostage - When comparing sessions with a hostage to sessions without 
a hostage: 
 
6A.  Offers will be higher when there is a hostage. 
   
6B.   Pre-commitments will be lower when there is a hostage. 
 
6C.   Offers are more likely to be accepted when there is a hostage. 
   
We find only weak support for Hypothesis 6A. As shown in Table 3, the coefficient on 
the hostage dummy is positive as expected, but the effect is not statistically significant. However, 
as seen in Table 4, we do find strong support for Hypothesis 6B in that pre-commitments with a 




significant evidence in favor of Hypothesis 6C (see Table 5), there is some anecdotal evidence 
that the presence of a hostage affected the decision to reject. In the nonbinding pre-commitment 
treatment with a hostage, responders rejected an offer that was lower than the pre-commitment 
level only once out of nine opportunities and the one offer that was rejected was a $0 offer. 
When no hostage was present, responders rejected such offers 7 out of 16 times. When there was 
no pre-commitment, responders rejected two offers with a hostage, and three offers without a 
hostage.  
We also hypothesized that, given the description of feeling judgment and extraverted 
orientation, the general effect of a hostage, if present, should be more pronounced in individuals 
with a preference for feeling in judgment and extraversion in orientation. The presence of a 
hostage, however, seemed to remove any differences attributed to judgment or orientation. While 
we found no statistically significant difference between thinkers and feelers or extraverts and 
introverts in the presence of a hostage, we did uncover an interesting result when interacting the 
hostage and gender variables. In terms of pre-commitments, females (controlling for binding pre-
commitment) tended to respond much more dramatically to the presence of a hostage than males. 
While male pre-commitments averaged $0.89 lower with a hostage than without (sig. one-tailed 
< 0.05), female pre-commitments were $4.48 lower on average with a hostage than without (sig. 
one-tailed < 0.01). For comparison purposes, female pre-commitments were lower than male 
pre-commitments by $2.18 when there was a hostage (sig. one-tailed < 0.05), but were actually 
higher than male pre-commitments by $1.40 (sig. two-tailed = 0.13) when there was no hostage. 
Furthermore, our results with respect to the interaction of hostage and gender were completely 




4.7 Pre-commitment – Binding, Nonbinding, and No Pre-commitment 
Because nonbinding pre-commitment serves no strategic function, we expect it to have 
no impact on offers. Furthermore, except for the fact that binding pre-commitment changes the 
sequential nature of the game to a simultaneous game, it does not change the fundamentals of the 
responder’s decision problem. Neither do we find any compelling argument for why nonbinding 
pre-commitment should differ from binding pre-commitment if individuals are accurately 
reporting nonbinding pre-commitments. However, if individuals view the process of choosing a 
pre-commitment decision as involving a stochastic component (that is, the dollar amount they 
initially record may be above or below their true willingness to accept), or if their willingness-to-
accept is somehow a function of the actual offer, then the imposition of binding pre-commitment 
may induce lower pre-commitment levels as an insurance-like premium to cover the case that 
their true pre-commitment level is lower than they initially think. Therefore, we formalize our 
expectations in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: Pre-commitment - When comparing treatments with no pre-
commitment, nonbinding pre-commitment, and binding pre-commitment: 
 
7A.  Offers will be no different under binding pre-commitment, 
nonbinding pre-commitment and no pre-commitment.  
 
7B.   Binding pre-commitments will be lower than nonbinding pre-
commitments.  
 
  We do not find support for Hypothesis 7A. In fact, offers are statistically significantly 
higher (sig. one-tailed < 0.05) when proposers face binding pre-commitments by responders 
relative to no or nonbinding pre-commitments. However, as shown in Table 4, we do find 
support for Hypothesis 7B in that pre-commitments that are binding average $1.54 less (sig. one-




5. Discussion   
  Our general results are consistent with those of previous studies of behavior in the simple 
ultimatum game. Proposers offered significantly more on average than the minimum allowable 
amount (in excess of $6 out of $15), and responders sometimes rejected positive offers. 
However, the results offer some very interesting insight into the impact of psychological 
variables, namely personality and pre-commitment, on individual offers and responses. 
  It came as no surprise to us that individuals with a so-called preference for “feeling” in 
judgment (F) would make higher offers than those with a preference for “thinking” (T). We were 
somewhat surprised by the lack of a similar statistically significant difference with respect to pre-
commitment levels. However, one can argue possibly that, contrary to our Hypothesis 1B, both F 
and T types should pre-commit to accepting low offers, but their reasons may differ. On the one 
hand, F types in general may view rejecting an offer as an uncooperative decision that brings 
about harm to the proposer, a value-based decision. On the other hand, T types may view 
rejecting an offer as a value-neutral decision that simply leaves money on the table. However, 
both views influence behavior in the same direction, making it unclear that either should pre-
commit to accepting lower offers than the other. In general, it does appear that EF types 
demonstrate the greatest “cooperative” behavior in the context of the ultimatum game, consistent 
with the Myers, et al (1998) description of such types as “action-oriented cooperators.” It would 
be interesting to know if similar results hold for other non-cooperative games. 
Our results with respect to gender are generally consistent with Solnick (2001) in that we 
find no systematic difference between males and females with respect to offers or willingness to 
accept offers. It is possible that previous studies such as Eckel and Grossman (2001) who find 




offer are merely capturing the predominance of feeling judgment in females. Neither of these 
studies control for judgment (thinking versus feeling), and feeling judgment is more frequently 
dominant in females (75.5%) than in males (43.5%) (Myers, et al, 1998, p. 157-8). However, 
although we did find a greater reaction by females to the presence of a hostage, we actually 
found females characterized as thinking types to be the “toughest” responders in terms of their 
self-reported pre-commitments to reject. 
  Furthermore, the effect of a powerless third party did appear to invoke a “feeling” 
response by responders, regardless of their preference for thinking versus feeling judgment 
according to the MBTI. That is, pre-commitments were significantly lower for both thinkers and 
feelers when a hostage was present. This provides some validation for the theory that non-
dominant mental functions are used in certain situations. The lack of an effect of a hostage on 
offers can probably be attributed to the fact that proposers can have no direct impact on the 
payoff to the hostage – it ultimately depends, of course, on the responder’s decision. 
  We find the impact of binding pre-commitment on both offers and responses to be 
intriguing. Offers appear to increase when the proposer knows that the responder makes a 
binding pre-commitment. Meanwhile, responders make lower pre-commitments when they are 
binding. The story here appears to be one of risk aversion and time inconsistency. That is, 
responders appear unsure of what they will truly accept. When pre-commitment is non-binding, 
responders make a “wishful thinking” pre-commitment to reject that they are unable to stick to 
once the offer is received. The time inconsistency problem appeared obvious to proposers. In 
fact, proposers actually made slightly lower offers on average under nonbinding pre-commitment 
compared to no pre-commitment, possibly due to a framing effect generated by the treatment that 




pre-commitment was binding, responders seem to react to their own uncertainty by choosing a 
lower, risk-averse pre-commitment, with many responders (nearly one-fourth) pre-committing to 
accepting basically any offer. Proposers, on the other hand, responded in a similar risk-averse 
fashion by making higher offers. 
Our final comments concern rejections. Our hypotheses indicated that individuals with 
the MBTI preference combination of extraversion (E) and feeling (F) should be the least likely to 
reject an offer. Remarkably, Figure 4 shows that only a single rejection occurred by an individual 
with an EF personality preference combination. While it is also true in general that, as predicted, 
more rejections resulted from I types than E types, and from T types than F types, these rejection 
rates by personality preference are roughly proportionate to the percentage of types in the 
sample, yielding little convincing evidence about which, if any, personality attributes matter for 
the final accept/reject response.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides an example of the insight into human economic behavior that can be 
gained by combining theories of mental activity from psychology with laboratory economic 
experiments. We have shown that differences between subjects with regard to judgment and 
orientation in particular, as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, lead to significant, 
predictable, and observable differences in subject decisions in a simple ultimatum game. Our 
research is the first that we are aware of to employ the MBTI specifically to investigate behavior 
in the context of a laboratory economics experiment. Using the MBTI and student volunteers 
from the United States Naval Academy (USNA) provided a unique opportunity to avoid the 





In general, we found behavior in our laboratory experiment to be quite consistent with 
expectations based on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of 
psychological type. That is, individuals with preferences for feeling (F) in judgment and 
extraversion (E) in orientation tended to make higher offers than those with preferences for 
thinking (T) and introversion (I). The effect of a feeling (F) preference on offers was more 
pronounced in females than in males, though we found no apparent effect of gender alone. Offers 
were also higher in general when proposers knew that responders were making a binding pre-
commitment, but were not different when a hostage was present. 
The research also sheds light on the decisions of responders to reject an offer. The results 
show that when responders were asked to write down their lowest acceptable offer, subjects pre-
committed to significantly lower amounts when the pre-commitment was binding compared to 
nonbinding. Extraversion (E) in orientation was consistent with a pre-commitment to accepting 
significantly lower offers than introversion (I). Responders, both those with a preference for 
thinking and those with a preference for feeling judgment, also made lower pre-commitments 
when a hostage was present, clearly demonstrating an altruistic or “feeling” response in general. 
The effect of a hostage on pre-commitment was also much more pronounced in females than in 
males even after controlling for judgment and orientation preferences. 
Furthermore, subjects rejected offers that were below their pre-commitment level only 
about a third of the time in the nonbinding pre-commitment sessions. These results suggest that 
subjects have difficulty determining what offer is “acceptable” and that they are strongly 
influenced by the actual offers. Ex ante unacceptable offers become strangely acceptable ex post.  
This research highlights the importance of considering preferences about how subjects 




experiments, and it provides validation for psychological test instruments that measure 
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Table 1. Subject summary by MBTI dichotomy and gender 
Experiment         U.S. Naval Academy***          U.S. Population** 





























































*Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 
**Source: Hammer and Mitchell (1996) 
***Approximately 1% of students have no recorded MBTI results. 
 













1 None  No  N=30  6.42  4.73 NA  NA 
2 None  Yes  N=30  6.73  8.34 NA  NA 
3 Nonbinding  No N=30  5.99 2.41  6.72  6.26 
4 Nonbinding  Yes N=30  6.53  4.46  4.78  8.66 
5 Binding  No N=30  7.40 2.35  4.90  7.21 





Table 3. OLS regression results for offers (two-tailed p-values in parentheses) 
Independent 
Variable 








       































































       
R
2    0.050 0.066 0.071 
Adj. R
2    0.011 0.028 0.028 
Sig.  F    0.258 0.104 0.116 
N    180 180 180 
       




Table 4. OLS regression results for pre-commitment levels (two-tailed p-values in parentheses) 
 
Independent Variable     
    
Constant   7.100 
(0.000) 
E   -1.081** 
(0.049) 
N   -0.157 
(0.771) 
T   0.273 
(0.632) 
J   -0.203 
(0.720) 






Binding     -1.536*** 
(0.004) 
    
R
2   0.164 
Adj. R
2   0.111 
Sig. F    0.005 
N   120 
    




Table 5. Probit regression results for responses, Accept = 1 (two-tailed p-values in parentheses) 
 
Independent Variable     
    
Constant   -0.623 
(0.29) 
Offer   0.334*** 
(0.000) 
E   0.128 
(0.664) 
N   -0.029 
(0.920) 
T   -0.351 
(0.273) 
J   0.128 
(0.678) 






Binding     -0.352 
(0.262) 
    
Pseudo R
2   0.169 
LR χ
2   20.51 
Sig. χ
2   0.005 
N (total decisions)    180 
Number of rejections    19 





Figure 1. Jungian theory of psychological type 
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Figure 2. Subject pool by whole personality type 
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Figure 4. Responders and rejections by whole personality type 



























































































Introduction:  The purpose of this experiment is to study how people behave in bargaining 
situations.  If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions there will be an 
opportunity for you to make money during the experiment.   
 
You have been randomly assigned to a role with these instructions. You will be randomly 
matched with a player (or players), but the identity of this player (or players) will remain 
unknown. At the end of the experiment, you will learn the results of the game. Your 
experimental earnings will be based on the results of your decisions and the decisions of the 
player (or players) with whom you are matched. 
 
In this experiment, $15.00 is to be divided between two persons: the “proposer” and the 
“responder.” In addition, a third player, player three, exists and earns money only if the proposed 
division of the $15.00 is accepted. You are the proposer.  
 
Your task is to make an offer of how to split $15.00 between you and the responder. The offer 
can be any monetary division of the $15.00 except for fractions of a penny. That is, offers are 
represented in penny increments, i.e. $0.00, $0.01, $0.02, …, $14.98, $14.99, $15.00 are 
legitimate offers. If the responder rejects the offer, all three players earn nothing. If the responder 
accepts the offer, you earn $15.00 minus the offer, the responder earns the offer, and player three 
earns $5.00. 
 
However, prior to seeing your offer, the responder has indicated a lowest acceptable offer (i.e., 
the lowest amount of the $15.00 they would be willing to accept). The lowest acceptable offer is 
not binding. That is, after seeing the offer, the responder can still decide whether to accept or 
reject your offer.  
 
Once again, upon receiving the offer, the responder will either accept or reject the offer.  
 
a)  If the offer is accepted, the responder earns the offer, you earn $15.00 minus the 
offer, and player three earns $5.00. 
 
b)  If the offer is rejected, all three players earn nothing. 
 
On the decision sheet, please write your experimental number and your proposed split of the 
$15.00 in the offer line (this is the amount you are offering to the responder, you earn $15.00 









Introduction:  The purpose of this experiment is to study how people behave in bargaining 
situations.  If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions there will be an 
opportunity for you to make money during the experiment.   
 
You have been randomly assigned to a role with these instructions. You will be randomly 
matched with a player (or players), but the identity of this player (or players) will remain 
unknown. At the end of the experiment, you will learn the results of the game. Your 
experimental earnings will be based on the results of your decisions and the decisions of the 
player (or players) with whom you are matched. 
 
In this experiment, $15.00 is to be divided between two persons: the “proposer” and the 
“responder.” In addition, a third player, player three, exists and earns money only if the proposed 
division of the $15.00 is accepted.  You are the responder.   
 
Your task is to decide whether to accept or reject an offer made by the proposer. The proposer 
will make an offer of how to split $15.00 between the proposer and responder. The offer can be 
any monetary division of the $15.00 except for fractions of a penny. That is, offers are 
represented in penny increments, i.e. $0.00, $0.01, $0.02, …, $14.98, $14.99, $15.00 are 
legitimate offers. If you reject the offer, all three players earn nothing.  If you accept the offer, 
you earn the offer, the proposer earns $15.00 minus the offer, and player three earns $5.00. 
 
However, prior to receiving the offer, you must indicate the lowest amount of the $15.00 you 
would be willing to accept. This is your “lowest acceptable offer.” However, your lowest 
acceptable offer is not binding. That is, after seeing the offer, you, the responder, can still decide 
whether to accept or reject the offer.  
  
Once again, upon receiving the proposal, you will respond by either accepting or rejecting the 
offer.   
 
a)  If the offer is accepted, you, the responder, earn the offer, the proposer earns $15.00 
minus the offer, and player three earns $5.00. 
 
b)  If the offer is rejected, all three players earn nothing. 
 
Please indicate your lowest acceptable offer on the line below 
LOWEST ACCEPTABLE OFFER = _________________________ (Not Binding) 
 
The experimenters will hand you an offer from the proposer you are matched with. Please write 
your experimental number on the responder number line. Then indicate whether you accept or 
reject the offer by circling the appropriate response. When completed please hand your response 






Introduction:  The purpose of this experiment is to study how people behave in bargaining 
situations.  If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions there will be an 
opportunity for you to make money during the experiment.   
 
You have been randomly assigned to a role with these instructions. You will be randomly 
matched with two players, but the identity of these players will remain unknown. At the end of 
the experiment, you will learn the results of the game. Your experimental earnings will be based 
on the results of the decisions of the other players with whom you are matched. 
 
In this experiment, $15.00 is to be divided between two persons: the “proposer” and the 
“responder.”  You are player three.   
 
Your task involves no decision. The other players are informed regarding your role and the rules 
concerning your earnings. 
 
The proposer will make an offer of how to split $15.00 between two players (the proposer and 
the responder). The offer can be any monetary division of the $15.00 except for fractions of a 
penny. That is, offers are represented in penny increments, i.e. $0.00, $0.01, $0.02, …, $14.98, 
$14.99, $15.00 are legitimate offers.  If the responder rejects the offer, all three players earn 
nothing.  If the responder accepts the offer, you earn $5.00, the proposer earns $15.00 minus the 
offer, and the responder earns the offer. 
 
Please write your experimental number on this sheet and turn it in when asked.  You will be 
randomly matched to a proposer and responder and your payoff will depend on the outcome of 
that game. 
 